This month’s feature is contributed by Nils Ringe (Brandeis class of 2001), Professor of Political Science and Director of the Jean Monnet EU Center of Excellence for Comparative Populism at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He introduces his newly published book, The Language(s) of Politics: Multilingual Policy-Making in the European Union (University of Michigan Press 2022). The eBook version is available for free on the publisher’s website.
Multilingualism is ubiquitous inside the institutions of the European Union (EU), but it has not received much attention from political scientists to date, even though language provides the basis for all interaction, collaboration, contestation, deliberation, persuasion, negotiation, and transaction between political actors. How does reliance on shared non-native languages, or on the EU’s extensive translation and interpretation services, affect EU politics and policy-making? My recently published book, The Language(s) of Politics: Multilingual Policy-Making in the European Union, relies on in-depth interviews with almost 100 policy-makers and language service providers in the EU’s main institutions, paired with quantitative and linguistic data, to show that multilingualism shapes the very nature and flavor of EU politics and policy-making in ways both subtle and profound.
Most importantly, I find that multilingualism depoliticizes policy-making—meaning that it reduces its political nature and potential for conflict—by simplifying, standardizing, and neutralizing the EU’s “language(s) of politics.” One reason for this is that communication in a shared foreign language (most often in English) tends to be simple, utilitarian, and standardized, because non-native speakers are unable to express themselves with the same ease and proficiency as in their mother tongues; because they have to make themselves understood by those with lower language competence; and because they must accommodate translation into other languages. The need for effective communication between non-native speakers becomes pivotal in EU politics and elevates the practical, communicative aspect of language over the political or ideological. As a result, what EU actors say or write becomes less indicative of their national and political backgrounds, preferences, and priorities. These effects are heightened by the prevalence of “EU English” as the main shared language, which is more neutral, utilitarian, standardized, “decultured,” and de-ideologized than “standard” English.
Reliance on the EU’s language services also simplifies, standardizes, and neutralize languages. Simultaneous interpreters of spoken language face the difficult challenge of having to convey—accurately and on the spot—not only the substance of what is said, but also the speaker’s intention, meaning, culture, and personality. This already exceedingly difficult task is further complicated by often rapid speech and the wide range of highly technical issues covered. As a result, the output of simultaneous interpretation inevitably tends to be more functional, simple, and standardized than the input language. Translators of written texts, meanwhile, rely extensively on existing documents, shared terminology databases, and commonly accepted and widely used phrases, rather than being “creative” in their translations. This is for good reason: all language versions of EU law are equally authentic, or equally “legally valid,” which requires that EU legislation is drafted and translated so that it is interpreted and applied consistently across the member states. The safest way to ensure this equivalence is for translators to rely on terminology, phrases, and formulations that are anchored in existing documents, all of which results in a standardization of the target language in the translation process. Another important depoliticizing effect of the equal authenticity principle is that it allows little room for ambiguity in the source text, which constrains the ability of political actors to use purposely vague language when negotiating and drafting legislation, thus blunting a popular tool for forging political agreement.
Multilingualism affects the EU’s political culture by shaping perceptions of political differences, polarization of opinion, intensity of debate, and the resonance of arguments and evidence. Overall, it makes the process and quality of policy-making more deliberate and rationalized. It is, however, problematic that genuinely divisive political problems become (partly) depoliticized due to multilingualism. Moreover, a depoliticized language of politics is more likely to be perceived by the general public as bland, abstract, and distant, which undermines the quality of representation and weakens the link between the EU and its citizens.